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A Destruction of Muslim Identity:
Ontario's Decision to Stop Shari'a-based Arbitrationt
I
"And if you fear a breach between the two,
appoint an arbiter from his people and an arbiter
from her people. If they both desire agreement, Allah
will effect harmony between them.
Surely Allah is ever Knowing, Aware."
-The Holy Qur'an, 4:35
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I. Introduction
September 1lth continues to be a significant day in Muslim-
American relations. On September 11, 2005, Canadian Premier
t The author would like to thank North Carolina Court of Appeals Judge Sanford
Steelman for the opportunity to present this paper to the North Carolina Dispute
Resolution Commission on August 25, 2006 at the Elon University School of Law in
Greensboro, North Carolina. The views expressed in this paper are the author's alone.
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Dalton McGuinty announced the rejection of all religious
arbitration within Ontario's legal system.' Formal legislation was
passed in Ontario to support the declaration on February 14,
2006.2 Notably, Premier McGuinty's decision ran counter to a
lengthy report commissioned by the government of Ontario by
former Attorney General Marion Boyd. That report, released in
late 2004, recommended the allowance of religious arbitration,
including Shari'a-based 3 arbitration, to settle certain types of
private disputes, such as property divisions in divorce.4
In siding with Boyd, this paper takes her report as its
foundation and borrows from it in significant ways. Specifically,
Boyd's general introduction to Ontario's arbitration system is
relied on heavily because it is an authoritative and straightforward
presentation of that system with specific attention to areas relevant
to the debate. Additionally, her report draws a balanced survey of
the positions of many groups who were involved in the debate
over religious arbitration in Ontario. The collection of views
presented in Boyd's paper have not been collected in any other
academic source and make this paper possible. Yet, to only
understand the debate over religious arbitration as limited to
Ontario would be to miss the insight it gives to the larger question
of how the law should deal with multiculturalism. Thus, this
paper's ultimate goal is to elaborate on and reinvigorate Boyd's
unheeded report, making the issue of religious arbitration she
discussed in Ontario relevant to a broader audience.
The debate over a limited incorporation of Shari'a5 law in
I Ontario Premier Rejects Use of Shariah Law, CBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2005,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2005/09/09/sharia-protests-20050909.html.
2 Kerry Gillespie, 'One Law for All Ontarians' in Divorce, Child Custody,
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 15, 2006, at A5.
3 Shari'a is one of several accepted transliterations of the Arabic: , Note
also that Arabic is read right to left. Transliterations of other Arabic words which are not
commonly integrated into English will appear in italics throughout this paper.
4 See generally MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW:
PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION (2004), available at http://www.attorney
general.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf.
5 Shari'a is the comprehensive Islamic code for all human activities. TANYA
GULEVICH, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM AND MUSLIM TRADITIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES, CELEBRATIONS, FESTIVALS, OBSERVANCES, BELIEFS, FOLKLORE,
CUSTOMS, AND CALENDAR SYSTEM OF THE WORLD'S MUSLIM COMMUNITIES, INCLUDING
AN OVERVIEW OF ISLAMIC HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY 193, 437 (2004). The topic is
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Canada mirrors recent controversies in other Western
democracies, particularly in Europe, where Muslim immigration
has presented acute challenges to national identity. The murder of
Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam 6 and the passage of certain laws in
France which effectively banned the hijab7 in public schools8
severely tested the role of tolerance as a central aspect of the
Dutch and French identities. 9 This tension between tolerance and
national identity reflects some of the fundamental problems for
minority cultures within the majoritarian structure of democracy
and also exposes major weaknesses in the philosophies of
multiculturalism and human rights.
Canada presents a unique ground for a discussion of minority
rights and multiculturalism because it is a leader in
accommodating minority nationalisms, indigenous people, and
immigrants.10 For example, the Catholic and French-speaking
singularities of Quebec led to certain historical exceptions, like the
constitutional veto, that some see as evidence of an asymmetrical
federalism in Canada." The country has also been confronted
with the aspirations of indigenous peoples for self-government and
addressed at length in Section III of this paper.
6 Craig S. Smith, In Mourning Slain Filmmaker, Dutch Confront Limitations of
Their Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at Al. Theo Van Gogh was a filmmaker in
The Netherlands who made a controversial film about Islamic culture in that country. Id.
He was killed by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a first-generation Dutch Muslim, who disagreed with
Van Gogh's views. Id.
7 Hijab means "screen, separation, cover, or partition in Arabic." GULEVICH,
supra note 5, at 193, 429 (internal quotation marks omitted). The most common
example of the hijab is the veil or headscarf. Id.
8 Elaine Sciolino, Debate Begins In France On Religion In the Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2004, at Al.
9 In resisting a demand from French Muslims to reconsider the ban on the hijab,
French President Jacques Chirac said in a speech, "France is a land of tolerance. France
ensures the equality, the respect, the protection of the free exercise of all religions in the
framework of our communal law. This tradition, anchored in our history, is the glue of
our national unity." Elaine Sciolino, France Won't Meet Demand To Stop Ban on Head
Scarves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at A5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 WILL KYMLICKA, FINDING OUR WAY: RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS
IN CANADA 2-3 (1998).
11 Cameron D. Bodnar, Practice and Principle: Asymmetrical Federalism in Canada
6 (2003), http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/bodnar.pdf (prepared for the 2003 Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Dalhousie Univ.).
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granted them partial autonomy.12  The desire for a limited
application of Shari'a by the Canadian Muslim community, now
the dominant religious minority in Canada, 3 is arguably part of the
same story. 14
Canada's confrontation with the Shari'a question is a
particularly compelling case study in multiculturalism for legal
observers in the United States. The Canadian experience confirms
that the debate surrounding Muslim communities in Western
democracies, of which the Shari'a movement is a part, is not
confined to the more homogeneous societies of Europe. Indeed,
the debate has arrived in North America. Further, the arbitration
system which catalyzed this particular debate in Canada exists in
essentially the same form within the United States. 5
To document the debate over Shari'a-based arbitration that
occurred in Ontario, this paper opens in Section II with an
introduction to the underlying laws in Ontario that offered a
limited space for the practice of Shari'a-based arbitration. The
highlights are drawn from Marion Boyd's presentation of
arbitration in Ontario. Section III explains the topics of Islam
relevant to the debate and the Muslim community's need for
Shari'a-based arbitration. Section V outlines the competing
philosophies in the debate, giving attention to particular voices
from Boyd's report. The final section offers the conclusion that
religious arbitration should continue in Ontario.
II. Alternative Dispute Resolution in Canada
The Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) was formed in
12 SAMUAL V. LASELVA, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN FEDERALISM 137
(1996).
13 STATISTICS CANADA, POPULATION BY RELIGION, By PROVINCES AND TERRITORIES
(2001 Census), available at http://www40.statcan.ca/L01/cst01/demo3Ob.htm.
14 S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2004).
15 The Council of Masajid met in 1988 and agreed to establish Shari'a arbitration
councils in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, Buffalo, Paterson, New
Brunswick, Trenton, Detroit, Lansing, Toledo, Columbus, Boston, Hartford,
Indianapolis, Gary, Chicago, Elgin, Champaign, Urbana, Miami, Houston, Dallas,
Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Baltimore, Washington D.C.,
Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its
Origins and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 79 (2002).
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2003.16 The formation of the IICJ sparked the beginning of debate
over Shari'a law in Ontario."7 When the debate erupted, however,
much of the dialogue centered around the flawed premise that the
Canadian government had only recently begun to allow "faith-
based" arbitration. 8  Actually, in a report prepared for the
Canadian Attorney General, Marion Boyd wrote, "family matters
[in Canada have] been arbitrated based on religious teachings for
many years in Jewish, Muslim, and Christian settings."'19 Nothing
in the Arbitration Act of 1991, the collection of statutes which
regulate arbitration in Ontario, restricts religious arbitration or
refers to "faith-based" decisions at all. 20 The IICJ, therefore, only
attempted to take advantage of what already existed-the general
right of arbitration to settle private disputes.2'
In public disputes where the State has a specific grievance with
an individual, such as crimes, the individual is required to submit
to the laws and courts of the State. 2 For most private disputes, on
the other hand, whether a dispute even exists is a matter
completely left to the parties.23 Consequently, there are no
requirements in the substantive law that must be followed to
resolve the disagreement. Individuals could even choose to have
their dispute decided by a coin flip. 24 If the parties come to agree
on a resolution themselves, this is called "alternative dispute
16 BOYD, supra note 4, at 3.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 4. See, e.g., Shariah Law: FAQs, CBC NEWS ONLINE, May 26, 2005,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/islam/shariah-law.html ("In 1991, Ontario was
looking for ways to ease the burdens of a backlogged court system. So the province
changed its Arbitration Act to allow 'faith based arbitration"').
19 BOYD, supra note 4, at 4.
20 The Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991) (Can.). This paper references
Ontario's Arbitration Act of 1991 as it existed before the changes approved on Feb. 14,
2006.
21 BOYD, supra note 4, at 4. It is worth noting that this practice has flourished in
the United States as well for many years. The Beth Din, a Jewish rabbinical court
operating out of New York, has settled issues of family and property law through
arbitration since 1960. Beth Din of America, http://bethdin.org (last visited Mar. 6,
2007).
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resolution" (ADR).25
ADR is mutually beneficial to the government and the
individual.26 It benefits the government because it keeps more
disputes out of the formal court system.27 This necessarily helps
reduce the possibility of backlogs, thereby accelerating resolution
of the cases that are in the formal court system.28 It also acts to
reserve the judges of the formal system, who are highly trained,
for the most complicated disputes.29 The individual also benefits
because, by empowering individuals to choose the process and
rules, the resolution is more likely to approximate the one
desired.3 ° In addition, private resolutions may save private parties
money and allow for greater confidentiality.3'
In recognition of these mutual benefits, Canada has made
efforts to encourage private dispute resolution.32 In Ontario, for
example, parties are required to go through mediation in most
cases before reaching the court system.33 For family law cases,
however, mediation is merely optional. 34 The Arbitration Act of
1991 was developed across Canada as a more formally structured
mechanism of ADR.35
A. The Arbitration Act of 1991
With the goal of providing a uniform set of arbitration rules
across Canada, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada proposed
the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1990.36 Ontario was the first
province to adopt the new rules in 1991, and these became
25 Id. at 9.
26 Id. at 10.
27 Id.





33 Id. Mediation refers generally to the inclusion of a third party in a private
dispute who helps the parties come to an agreement. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003
(8th ed. 2004).
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effective in 1992."7 This Act is referred to as the Arbitration Act
of 1991 (Arbitration Act).38  The primary function of the
Arbitration Act is to offer procedural rules for an arbitration
process.3 9 The Arbitration Act facilitates the use of that process by
allowing the courts to appoint an arbitrator when the parties cannot
agree and by legally sanctioning the results of properly conducted
arbitrations.4"
Ontario allowed arbitration even before the adoption of the
Arbitration Act, with the earliest occurring in the nineteenth
century.4' The new rules adopted in 1991 were simply reflective
of a broader public acceptance of arbitration, and they effectively
reduced the supervisory capacity of the courts.42 Most importantly
for framing the Shari'a debate, however, is that under both the old
and new arbitration systems, private parties in Ontario were
allowed to settle family law and property disputes.
43
Flexibility is the centerpiece of the Arbitration Act. The law
allows both parties to choose any arbitrator.44 No qualifications or
certifications, such as a law degree, legal experience, or even
Canadian citizenship, are required. The sole requirement is that
the arbitrator must be neutral as to the parties concerned. 45 This
requirement is supported by section 46.1 of the Arbitration Act,
which allows for an arbitration award to be set aside where "there
is a reasonable apprehension of bias" on the part of the arbitrator. 46
But section 46.4 specifically allows parties to waive even this
restriction. 7
37 Id. at 10-11. At the time of Boyd's, report seven provinces had adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act: Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick,
Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia. Id. at 12 n.9.
38 Id. at 11.
39 Id.
40 BOYD, supra note 4, at 12.
41 Id. at 11.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 12.
45 The Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17, §§ 11.1, 46.1 (1991) (Can.).
46 § 46.1.
47 § 46.4 (providing that courts are restricted from setting aside an arbitration
decision where the disadvantaged party fails to use section 13 to bring a challenge or
2007]
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The parties also decide which law will govern the arbitration.48
Usually, parties rely on the law of their own province.4 9 But the
parties can designate any specific set of laws to apply, or the
arbitrator can choose for them. ° Arbitrators commonly make the
choice of applicable laws in diversity cases.5 The Arbitration Act
does not require that the laws used in the arbitration come from a
specific place or governmental body like Ontario. Any set of
laws, such as the rules governing a private organization, rules
invented by the parties, or even rules based on religious teachings,
can be chosen.52 At the end of the arbitration, the arbitrator, or
arbitration council, will deliver a decision called the arbitral
award.53 Whether the result is an order directing one party to
perform an act for another party, or simply a monetary award, the
courts will enforce the arbitral award against a losing party.54
It is hard to estimate the exact number of private arbitrations
that have occurred under the Arbitration Act because the process is
private by nature.55 The highest number of arbitrations seem to
occur in Toronto because the formal court system is so
backlogged. 6 Of groups offering mediation and arbitration that
submitted statistics for Marion Boyd's report, the average number
of arbitrations conducted by each group per year was between
thirty and thirty-five. 57 Very few of those arbitrations ever ended
up in the formal court system.58 This last point seems to confirm
that parties have a high satisfaction rate with the process.
fails to be successful on such a challenge).
48 §31.
49 BOYD, supra note 4, at 12.
50 The Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17, § 32.1 (1991) (Can.).
51 § 32.1.
52 BOYD, supra note 4, at 12.
53 Id. at 13.
54 Id. The enforcement is delayed if there is an appeal pending under section 5 or if
the period for appeal (30 days under section 5) is not exhausted. Id.
55 Id. at 34-35.
56 Id. at 35.
57 Id.
58 BOYD, supra note 4, at 35.
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B. Limits of Arbitration
Notwithstanding the extreme flexibility provided by the
Arbitration Act, there are some limits to arbitration. The first set
of limits is legal and overlaps with the general limits of freedom of
contract. The arbitrator's jurisdiction arises from the submission
of both parties; therefore, it is critical that the parties voluntarily
enter into the arbitration.59 The corollary is that the arbitrator can
only decide issues that the parties have submitted to arbitration.6"
As with contracts, the result of the arbitration cannot force either
party to perform an illegal act.6 The legal rules of capacity also
apply-no party can be under the legal age, subject to duress when
they enter arbitration, or mentally incompetent.62 Finally, while
most civil issues can be arbitrated, no criminal or personal status
cases can be subject to enforceable arbitration. 63 As a result of the
exclusion of personal status cases, two key aspects of family law
are expressly excluded from arbitration: the recognition of
parenthood and the grant of divorce.'
The Arbitration Act also contains certain procedural limits to
arbitration which are designed to ensure the fairness of whatever
form the arbitration takes. Section 19 requires that the parties be
treated "equally and fairly,, '65 and section 6 allows the courts to
intervene in an arbitration to ensure such equitable treatment.66
The equitable requirement cannot be waived by the parties.67
The appeals procedures also help ensure equitable treatment.
A party can request a court to hear an appeal by convincing the
court that an important question of law is raised affecting the
59 Id. at 13.
60 Id. at 14.
61 Id. at 13.
62 Id. at 13-14.
63 Id. at 14. Courts will set aside any arbitration decision that violates the subject
matter jurisdiction limits of The Arbitration Act. The Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17,
§ 46.1.5 (1991) (Can.).
64 BOYD, supra note 4, at 14. Civil divorce can only be performed under the
Divorce Act of Canada. Id. No laws prohibit the ability of parties to seek a religious
divorce. Those decrees, however, are not legally enforceable. Id.
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rights of the party.68 Unlike the equitable requirements, however,
the right to appeal may be waived.69 Where a court is presented
with an appeal, the matter can become even more difficult if
Ontario law is not the basis of the arbitration because the judges
may lack experience or familiarity with the law that was used.7"
The procedural limits that show concern for equitable
treatment of the parties also have substantive counterparts. Some
courts, for example, have set aside arbitral awards that resulted
from an equitable process but were nonetheless inequitable in their
results. 7' The restriction of section 50.7, which provides that a
court cannot enforce an order that it "would not have jurisdiction
to make itself," can also be read broadly to defeat awards that a
court might find unfair.72 The Arbitration Act does not, however,
expressly allow courts to set aside an award on "public policy"
grounds.73
While the statute includes many limits to ensure fairness and
flexibility in arbitration, certain protections of the Arbitration Act
are subject to expiration.74 For example, appeals against an actual
award must be made within thirty days. 75 The underlying purpose
of this limitation is to encourage parties to raise problems as they
appear, rather than holding on to an objection as insurance against
an adverse award.76
68 § 45.
69 BOYD, supra note 4, at 15 (citing The Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17, §3 (1991)
(Can.), which does not list § 45 as a non-waivable provision).
70 Id. This weakness of the appeals process is significant for the discussion of the
Shari'a debate. An example of this problem would be where, on review of an arbitral
award, a judge did not recognize the mahr or imposed support obligations on a wife for
the children. These aspects of women's rights under Shari'a are explored later. BOYD,
supra note 4, at 53.
71 BOYD, supra note 4, at 16 (citing Hercus v. Hercus, [2001] O.J. No. 1541, 7
R.F.L. (5th) 301 (Sp. Ct.), para. 41).
72 Id. The court simply defines its jurisdiction as inherently limited to granting fair
and equitable awards. Id.
73 Id.
74 The Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17, §4 (1991) (Can.).
75 §47.
76 BOYD, supra note 4, at 17.
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C. Family Law in Ontario
The federal and provincial governments of Canada share
jurisdiction over family law.77 The federal Divorce Act concerns
married couples who want a divorce and various issues related to
divorce, such as child and spousal support claims, custody, and
access to children.78 Provincial laws govern all other family law
matters such as "separation [as distinct from divorce] of married or
unmarried couples, custody, access, support, division and
possession of property, restraining orders, and related issues of
child protection and enforcement of orders."79  In Ontario, the
relevant law is called the Family Law Act (FLA).8° Neither the
federal Divorce Act nor the FLA mention arbitration, although
they expressly encourage mediation.8'
The division of property in the event of divorce depends
heavily on applicable provincial law governing the couple.82 In
Ontario, the property division laws used by the formal courts
generally strive for a fifty-fifty split between the shared assets of
the divorcing spouses. 8' To calculate the actual split, each
spouse's net family property is defined.84 Net family property is
determined by considering all the property a spouse owns,
accounting for certain deductions and exceptions.85 The spouse
who holds less net family property is entitled to one half of the
difference between the two net family properties.86 The courts are
able to increase or decrease either spouse's share to correct for
equitable concerns, such as intentional depletion, or to honor a
written agreement between the spouses that is not a domestic
contract.87
77 Id. at 19.
78 The Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3 (1985) (Can.).
79 BOYD, supra note 4, at 18.
80 Id.
81 Id. For more on mediation, see supra note 33.
82 Id.




87 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 5.6 (1990) (Can.).
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Ontario's statutes are notable for making some of the strongest
statements in Canada encouraging gender equality in the divorce
process. 88 The Preamble to the FLA states that the purpose of the
statute is to "recognize the equal position of the spouses as
individuals within marriage and to recognize marriage as a form of
partnership" and, therefore, to insure "an equitable settlement"
when the relationship dissolves.89 Gender equality is written into
the laws but may prove less enforceable when divorce settlements
occur outside the formal court system.
And in fact, despite all of the formal court provisions and
equality protections regarding property settlements in divorce,
many couples still decide to make use of informal processes.9 ° As
part of these informal processes, parties are completely free to
consult any advisor they wish in order to arrive at a decision. 91 As
in any life decision, attorneys, friends, and clergy are all
commonly consulted. 92 The result of these more informal, private
processes is often a domestic contract, dividing property in a
specific way by agreement of the parties. 93
A domestic contract supersedes the distribution rules of the
FLA unless the contract violates one of the public policy
parameters of the Act.94  Domestic contracts can effectively
remove all property from the calculation of net family property,
resulting in no sharing between the spouses. 95 Child support
agreements can also be subject to a domestic contract, which may
provide for less support by one spouse than the FLA would
provide.96  Spousal support may be completely avoided by
contract.97 Spouses can also contract as to the education and moral
88 § 5.6.
89 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, pmbl. (1990) (Can.).
90 BOYD, supra note 4, at 19.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 20.
94 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 2(10) (1990) (Can.).
95 § 5.6.
96 § 33.15b. The ultimate amount of child support is subject to broad policy limits.
A child support agreement can always be set aside by the court if it is determined that the
amount is not in the best interest of the child. § 56.1.
97 § 33.4. The same section also lists the occasions where the court can override
[Vol. XXXII
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training a child will receive.98
Certain parameters related to conscionability and informed
consent exist for domestic contracts. For example, the contracts
can be set aside by the court if the agreement is deemed not in the
best interest of a child who is involved.9 Any domestic contract
can be set aside in whole or in part if the court finds that the party
did not understand the nature and consequences of the contract.100
Typically courts conclude that the party must have consulted with
an attorney familiar with Ontario's FLA before agreeing to a
domestic contract.10 1
In terms of religion, a domestic contract can be overturned if
one spouse has not taken the necessary steps to release the other
spouse from religious barriers to remarriage.0 2 This provision
seeks to avoid the ability of one spouse to use a religious barrier
for leverage in the contract negotiations.'03 Courts have the widest
possible scope for intervention on this ground because it applies to
the settlement of any family matter in any form including "written
or oral arrangement[s]."'04 This section also applies to an arbitral
award because such awards qualify as "written or oral
arrangement[s]."' 5  This broad intervention power evinces a
recognition that family negotiations involving religious principles
risk a particular type of leveraging not possible in nonreligious
negotiation.'06
In the end, the FLA may merely create an entitlement to a
claim-the privileges or benefits one might receive under the
FLA-which a spouse can disclaim.'0 7 The tone of the FLA is
predominantly voluntary in order to empower individuals who, for
such a spousal support agreement.
98 § 56.1.
99 § 56.1.
100 § 56.4. Other typical capacity restrictions associated with contracts, such as lack
of consent or duress also apply. Id.
101 BOYD, supra note 4, at 21.
102 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 2.4 (1990) (Can.).
103 BOYD, supra note 4, at 22.
104 Id.; see also Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch. F.3, § 56.6.
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a variety of reasons, such as the need for confidentiality or
efficiency, want to avoid the courts."°8 The risk, though, is that a
party will be subjected to unequal bargaining power that falls short
of coercion, thus leaving the party bound by the agreement. For
example, in the case of Miglin v. Miglin, the wife signed a spousal
support waiver in exchange for a position in the family business."
When she later decided this was not a favorable settlement, she
attempted to renege, but the court held her to the agreement." 0
Canada's stance on polygamy, the practice of having more
than one spouse,"' demands specific consideration within a
discussion of Shari'a and family law. Polygamy is a criminal
offense in Canada that is punishable by up to five years in
prison. 112 The criminal penalty applies to both those who are party
to a polygamous union and those who perform a rite or ceremony
attempting to create such a union."' However, the law prohibiting
polygamy is rarely enforced. 14 Marion Boyd's report found that
polygamous marriages were, in fact, being conducted in
Ontario." 5
For polygamous marriages performed in a jurisdiction that
properly recognizes such unions, such as a Muslim country, the
FLA acknowledges the parties as "spouses," notwithstanding the
Criminal Code. 16  Such polygamous "spouses," therefore, are
entitled to the property distribution afforded to any spouse under
the FLA."' Thus, polygamy does have the effect of reducing the
share of previous spouses in a property distribution, but no spouse
108 Id.
109 Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] S.C.R. 550.
110 Id.
111 WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1500 (New Deluxe ed.
2001).
112 Criminal Code of Canada, ch. C-46, § 293 (1985).
113 §§ 293 (a) & (b).
114 BOYD, supra note 4, at 23.
115 Id.
116 In the FLA definition of "spouse," a reference to marriage includes a marriage
that is actually or potentially polygamous, if it was celebrated in a jurisdiction whose
system of law recognizes it as valid. Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 1.2 (1990)
(Can.).
117 BOYD, supra note 4, at 23.
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loses the right to claim spousal status under the FLA. "8
The term "spouse" is given a broad definition in the FLA. A
person can become a spouse in three ways: by getting married, by
residing with another person for three years, or by having a
relationship of some permanence if two people are the parents of a
child." 9 In Ontario, both men and women may marry multiple
times, whereas only men may have multiple spouses under Islamic
law. 120  The difference may be explained by the fact that under
Islamic law, only the husband is required to provide support
(mata'a)121 to the wife and not vice-versa. 122
III.Muslims and Shari'a in Canada
The presentation of Ontario's arbitration system and family
law explains how religious laws were able to gain a foothold in the
province. Outside observers likely would not be surprised to learn
that Catholic and Jewish arbitration operated in Ontario under this
legal structure because most people are familiar with the presence
of members of those religions in North America. But many may
wonder how Muslim arbitration came to be so strongly asserted
there and what exactly Muslim arbitration might look like. This
section of the paper introduces the Muslim population of Canada,
the principles of Shari'a, how Shari'a-based arbitration was
actually practiced in Ontario, and the role of Muslim women in the
Canadian Muslim community.
118 Id.
119 Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, §§ 2, 29 (1990) (Can.).
120 M.A. QURESHI, MUSLIM LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND MAINTENANCE 65
(1995) ("It is generally said that a Muslim husband can marry four times, whereas the
wife can marry only one husband."). The relevant verse of the Qur'an is Qur'an 4:3:
"And if ye fear that ye will not deal fairly by the orphans, marry of the women who seem
good to you, two or three or four and if ye fear that ye cannot be justice (to so marry)
than one (only) or (the captives) that your right hands possess. Thus it is more likely that
ye will not do injustice." See id. (quoting THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:3).
121 ASGHAR ALl ENGINEER, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 155-56 (2004)
(indicating that there is some dispute about the exact translation of mata'a).
122 BOYD, supra note 4, at 24. But see ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 157 (explaining
that there is some debate about the requirement of a husband to pay mata'a; Imam
Muhammad, for example, says there is no such requirement).
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A. An Identity Portrait
Roughly a third of all Muslims live in countries where they are
in the minority.123 Today, Muslims and various Islamic
organizations are prevalent in the largest Canadian cities.14 The
majority of Canada's Muslims are recent immigrants. 125  In
contrast, the Muslim community in America dates to the time
when the first African slaves were brought over by the European
colonists. 126 Thirteen Muslims were reported to live in Canada in
1871.127 By 1981, the number had grown to 98,165.128 Today,
there are about 579,640 Muslims in Canada, accounting for nearly
2% of the entire Canadian population and representing the largest
religious minority in Canada.129 Ontario has the largest share of
the Canadian Muslim population at 352,530.130 In contrast, the
Canadian population overall is relatively homogenous: 85% of the
Canadian population is white and 95% of the population is
Christian. 131
There is significant diversity within the Canadian Muslim
community. Muslim immigrants have come to Canada from
across the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South America, and the
Caribbean. 132  This wide diversity of national origin leads to
significant variation of languages, ethnic backgrounds, races, and
even versions of Islam. 133 Emigration from Muslim countries has
largely been driven by political and economic unrest. 134 Canada
has served as an attractive destination for Muslim emigrants
123 AHMAD F. YOUSIF, MUSLIMS IN CANADA: A QUESTION OF IDENTITY 12 (1993).
124 Id. at 13.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN NORTH AMERICA 76 (Earle Waugh, Baha
Abu-Laban, and Regula Qureshi eds., 1983)).
128 Id. (citing A. RASHID, THE MUSLIM CANADIAN: A PROFILE A PROFILE ON
OTrAWA 15-19 (1985)).




132 YOUSIF, supra note 123, at 14.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 14.
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because of its relative economic advantages, educational
opportunities, and the guarantees of freedom of faith and
expression.'35  However, these guaranteed freedoms create a
ideological rift in the Muslim immigrant community of Canada.
Some Muslim immigrants have come hoping to be free to practice
the customs and religion of their former homes, while others have
come to escape the restrictions that custom and religion may have
imposed on them. 1
36
The religious aspects of Muslim identity have affected the
immigrants so significantly because Islam covers all areas of life,
both social and spiritual.13 1 Most Muslim countries, however,
have not been formally governed by Islamic laws since the time of
Western colonization.' But the values and traditions of Islamic
faith continue to pervade Muslim societies as part of the social
structure, encouraging its practice. 3 9 For example, any Westerner
who has spent a single night in a Muslim country knows well the
calls of the muezzin that echo across Muslim cities at sunrise,
calling the faithful to prayer. 40 This Islamic-based social structure
is not in place in Canada, leaving many Muslim immigrants
disoriented when they arrive in a country whose policies and
structures have developed around Christian traditions.141 Even the
simple rite of praying five times each day can present
complications to a Muslim in a Christian country. At work or
school, it may be difficult to find a private place to pray.
Answering the call to prayer on Friday (the Muslim Sabbath) at
the local mosque may mean choosing between Islam and a job.
142
Muslims in Canada are confronted with a paradox. On the one
hand, they experience more religious freedom than in the Muslim
countries they left behind; but on the other hand, that religious
135 Id. at 17.
136 BOYD, supra note 4, at 46.
137 Id. at 14.
138 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 68.
139 YOUSIF, supra note 123, at 15.
140 The muezzin is the "man who performs the adhan, or call to prayer." Gulevich,
supra note 5, at 434.
141 Id. at 22
142 BOYD, supra note 4, at 46; see also SHAHID ATHAR, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AMERICAN MUSLIM 3-4 (1994).
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freedom flows from a larger guarantee of freedom to all
Canadians, which entails activities beyond the limits of Islam.
Some of the disorientation for Muslims, therefore, owes to the
very freedom that attracted Muslim immigrants to Canada in the
first place. Muslims in Canada may frequently experience a
pressure to pass beyond the limits of the Islamic faith in a society
that proudly protects the right of the individual to drink alcohol,
eat pork, charge bank interest, gamble, or have premarital sex.143
While Islam is made up of certain rules and restrictions which
apply to any follower, the religion is fundamentally defined by
five main principles or pillars: 1) Shahadah: the belief that Allah
is the only god and Muhammad (pbuh)'" was his final Prophet; 2)
Salat: the observance of prayer five times per day; 3) Sawm:
observing the fast of Ramadan; 4) Zakat: giving to charity; 5) The
Hajj: making the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a person's
lifetime. 145
In 1993, Ahmad F. Yousif conducted a study of 152 Muslims
living in the Canadian National Capital Region (CNCR), which is
to say in or near Ottawa, Ontario. 146 Part of the study included a
survey asking whether the individuals continued to observe Salat,
Sawm, and Zakat after moving to Canada and which activity was
most valuable to their Muslim identity. 147 This survey was done to
observe the stability of these three "active" pillars of Muslim life,
how they are incorporated into Canadian life, and to better
understand the state of Muslim identity in Canada and what it
depends on most.
143 Id. at 16. Of course, this may also be the case in the former Muslim country
which they left.
144 The parenthetical "(pbuh)" is an acronym for "peace be upon him," a translation
of the phrase which is commonly invoked as a sign of respect any time the Prophet's
name is written or spoken. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 40 n.58.
145 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 41. While these five tenets are consistent
between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, there are numerous religious groups in North
America that claim to follow Islam but may not identify with the five tenets. Examples
of such groups operating outside the five pillars are The Ahmadiyyah Movement, The
Moorish Science Temple of America, The Lost Found Nation of Islam (commonly
known as Nation of Islam), and the Nubian Islamic Hebrews (commonly known as the
Ansaru Allah Community). See id. at 43-44.
146 YOUSIF, supra note 123, at 27.
147 Id. at 31-54.
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More than sixty percent of respondents reported that they
continued to perform Salat, the prayers given facing Mecca, at
least sometimes.'48 Of those that continued to pray, more than half
performed all five prayers each day. 149 Nearly seventy percent of
the respondents rated the paying of Zakah, as "very important" to
their identity,"O and a majority of those same respondents
continued to make the contribution each year.' 5' Almost eighty
percent of respondents continued to observe the demanding fast of
Ramadan, 5 2 which involves a prohibition from sunrise to sunset
on eating, drinking, and smoking as well as on voluntary vomiting,
self-pollution, sexual intercourse, and other practices. 53 Another
ten percent stated that they continued to observe Ramadan only
when outside of Canada. 1
54
Based on these findings, Yousif reached several conclusions.
Most significant is the observation that Muslim identity in Ottawa
closely tracks with the performance of the traditional pillars of
Islam and that most Muslims in the CNCR continue to observe
these rites. 55 In other words, Islam has not been reinvented
simply because of a geographic movement. Also, even though
practicing the "active" pillars certainly leads to a strong sense of
Muslim identity, it does not guarantee that the Muslim identity
achieved in Canada is secure. 156 Finally, Muslims may have a
strong sense of identity in Canada but also experience racism or
discrimination or feel that their Muslim identity is under attack by
social pressures.'57
As an individual engages in activities that are expressly
forbidden by one's religion, or is prevented from maintaining
practices that are critical to that religion, the individual
148 Id. at 33 (figure 2).
149 Id. at 35 (figure 3).
150 Id. at 45 (figure 7).
151 Id. at 44.
152 YOUSIF, supra note 123, at 45 (figure 7).
153 Id. at 45.
154 Id. at 47.
155 Id. at 54.
156 Id. at 79.
157 Id. at 55-82.
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experiences a dissonance related to identity.158 Stated simply, if to
be Muslim is to follow Shari'a, it necessarily follows that one who
does not follow Shari'a is not Muslim. In recognition of this fact,
Irshad Abdal-Haqq writes: "[Islamic law] must command the
attention of any Muslim community seeking to preserve and assert
itself."'
159
B. Shari'a: A Basic Introduction to the Principles
While the basic tenets of the Muslim faith are easy to define,
Islamic law is a much more complex and contentious issue. In
Ontario the public's misconception of the Arbitration Act was
perhaps only equaled by its misconception of Shari'a law. For
example, during the debate, many Canadians who argued against
Shari'a-based arbitration believed they were dissenting to the
formation of "Shari'a Tribunals."'' " The Council of American-
Islamic Relations of Canada (CAIR-CAN) explains why this
conception of Shari'a-based arbitration was a mistake:
It is inappropriate and misleading to use the word "shariah" to
describe an arbitration tribunal that will use Islamic legal
principles to resolve a very specific and limited set of civil
disputes which may be the subject of arbitration under Ontario's
Arbitration Act. Moreover, such a tribunal is not a full-fledged
Islamic court, as may be inferred by the use of the word
"shariah", and its limited jurisdiction stems from the Act. The
tribunal will, more appropriately, be a form of Muslim dispute
resolution, consistent with Canadian law and the Charter within
the flexibility of Islamic normative principles. 161
To properly consider the debate that occupied Ontario, it is
important to juxtapose the freedoms allowed by the Arbitration
Act and the actual tenets of Shari'a. By observing the actual
principles of Shari'a, a more complete appreciation of the stakes
158 YOUSIF, supra note 123, at 59-60 (specifically addressing the issue of the effect
of the legalized consumption of alcohol on adolescents).
159 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 30.
160 See, e.g., BOYD supra note 4, at 54 quoting Homa Arijomand ("We strongly
believe that Shari'a tribunals will crush women's liberties.").
161 BOYD, supra note 4, at 45. The arbitration referred to here is "Shari'a-based
arbitration" which comprehends the explanation of CAIR-CAN, but also accounts for the
fact that non-Muslims could also choose to settle a family law dispute using Shari'a-
based arbitration.
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in the Shari'a debate emerges.
Islamic law is understood in two forms, Shari'a and fiqh.
Shari'a is the word relating to the primary sources of law. 162  It
literally means "path to the watering place" 163 which is meant to
convey the idea that Shari'a is the source of life. 64 The word
traces directly to a verse in the Qur'an:165 "Then we put thee on
the [right] Way of religion; so follow thou that [Way], and follow
not the desires of those who know not."'166  Shari'a draws from
both the Qur'an, Allah's revelation to mankind as recorded by
Muhammad (pbuh), 167 and the Sunnah, which includes the sayings
of Muhammad (pbuh) and things he did as well as those things he
refrained from doing. 1
68
While Shari'a is meant to govern all human activity, specific
issues naturally arise that are not covered. In that event, one is to
use reason to deduce the principles Shari'a would apply. 169 This
process is called ijtihad, which literally means "to exert
oneself."17  The concept is embodied in the following
conversation between Muhammad and one of his appointed
162 Id.
163 QURESHI, supra note 120. Shari'a actually has several accepted English
translations such as "pathway," "path to be followed," "way to be cleared," and "path
leading to the water." See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 33.
164 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 33.
165 Qur'an means "that which should be recited, read, or studied" and refers to the
book embodying the revelation from Allah to Muhammad (pbuh). Id. at 45.
166 Id. (citing THE HOLY QUR'AN 45:18, in A. YOUSEF ALl, THE HOLY QUR'AN,
TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTARY 1359 (1934)). Note that references to passages
in the Qur'an include two numbers. The first number is the sura, or chapter, the second
is the ayat, or verse. See C.T.R. HEWER, UNDERSTANDING ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION 5 1-
53 (2006).
167 Muhammad ibn Abdullah (pbuh) is understood to be the final prophet of Allah in
Islam. His teachings, which founded the faith, began around 610 C.E. in Arabia. Abdal-
Haqq, supra note 15, at 33. For more on Muhammad (pbuh), see IBN ISHAQ, THE LIFE
OF MUHAMMAD (A. Guillaume trans., Oxford University Press 2002).
168 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 33. Allah is the supreme being in Islam, related
to the idea of God in Judaism and Christianity. The defining verse in the Qur'an is
112:4: "Say: He is Allah, The One and Only; Allah, the Eternal, the Absolute; He begets
not, nor is He begotten, And there is none like unto Him." THE HOLY QUR'AN 112:4.
169 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 33 (citing SAID RAMADAN, ISLAMIC LAW, ITS
SCOPE AND EQUITY 62 (1970)).
170 Id. (emphasis added).
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judges, which is recorded in the Sunnah:
According to what shalt thou judge? He replied: According to
the Book of Allah. And if thou findest nought therein?
According to the Sunnah of the Prophet of Allah. And if thou
findest nought therein? Then I will exert myself to form my
own judgment. Praise be to God Who has guided the messenger
of His Prophet to that which pleases His Prophet.'
7'
The second and more complicated aspect of Islamic law, called
fiqh, means "intelligence."'' 72 It is both the counterpart to Shari'a
and the application of ijtihad. 173 In practical terms, fiqh represents
the actual laws deduced to form Shari'a, which cover all legal
issues concerning religion, politics, civil and criminal matters,
constitutions, and procedural law. 174  These laws are subject to
change depending on the circumstances, whereas the principles of
Shari'a are considered monolithic. 
7 5
Nineteen different schools of fiqh, called fiqh madhabs,
176
developed in the first four centuries of Islam, between the seventh
and eleventh centuries. 177 The schools developed "as Islam spread
to new lands and confronted new cultures that were not addressed
directly in the Qur'an and Sunnah."'' 78 Today, only five schools
exist: four Sunni and one Shi'a.79 The average well-read Muslim
is knowledgeable of these five schools and failure to belong to
171 Id. (citing SAID RAMADAN, ISLAMIC LAW, ITS SCOPE AND EQUITY 75 (1970)).
172 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 37.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. Shari'a is considered infallible because it is the law of God while ijtihad is
merely a process of men attempting to understand God's intentions. Fiqh, therefore, is
open to debate. Id. (citing A. BILAL PHILIPS, THE EVOLUTION OF FIQH 100 (3d ed. 1992)).
176 Madhab literally means "way of going." Id. at 67.
177 Id. (citing MUHAMMAD IQBAL, RECONSTRUCTIONS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN
ISLAM 137 (2d ed. 1989)).
178 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 67.
179 Id. at 38-39. The four Sunni schools are: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali.
Jafari is the predominant school of the Shi'a. GULEVICH, supra note 5, at 48. For an
explanation of the historic origins of the Sunni and Shi'a, see ALKA SINGH, WOMEN IN
MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW 22-24 (1992). For an editorial showing how lack of knowledge
on this subject has injured American foreign policy, see Jeff Stein, Can You Tell A Sunni
From a Shiite?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A21.
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only one school was traditionally viewed as heresy. 8 ° The
differences between the schools can be very significant on a given
issue.'81 Consequently, the claims of one Muslim in a particular
case may be completely different from those of another Muslim
presented with the same set of facts. 1
8 2
Fiqh can be understood as both the process of deducing and
applying the principles of Shari'a as well as the collection of the
deductions reached by specific jurists.'83 The process of fiqh is
divided into two sections.'m The first, known as the "roots," is
called usul al-fiqh, which refers to the methodology and
interpretation principles used in determining the law.'85 The
second, known as the "branches," is calledfaru al-fiqh. 86 It is the
practice of law and deals with the actual decisions, called fatawa,
reached by applying usul al-fiqh.87 The five major schools of fiqh
agree on the four main elements offiqh. 88
The four primary elements of fiqh emerged in the period after
Muhammad and his companions who are called the Sahaba.'89 In
order to engage in fiqh, a person attempting to make exegesis of
the Qur'an must: 1) have a mastery of Classical Arabic,'9" 2) have
a complete understanding of the overall message of Islam; 3) have
the ability to perceive meanings, abstract relations, and
generalizing principles apparent in the various passages of the
Qur'an; and 4) be familiar with the traditions arising from
180 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 38.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 50.
184 Id.
185 Id. (citing ISMAIL R. AL FARUQI & Lois L. AL FARUQI, THE CULTURAL ATLAS OF
ISLAM 267 (1986)).
186 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 50.
187 Id. (citing MOHAMMAD H. KHAN, THE SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 5
(1991)).
188 Id. at 51.
189 Id.
190 The language of Arabic has many forms. For example, the Arabic spoken by
Egyptians is different in significant ways from the Arabic spoken in Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon. Classical Arabic refers to the Arabic used in the Qur'an. It is the language
used in newsprint throughout the Middle East. See SIONA JENKINS, EGYPTIAN ARABIC
PHRASEBOOK 9-10 (2001).
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Muhammad and the Sahaba.191 Apart from these four
prerequisites, the various schools diverge in the techniques that are
actually applied to generate fiqh.'92 Thus, performing exegesis of
the Qur'an is a serious affair requiring satisfaction of the
prerequisites and knowledge of the deduction skills used by the
particular school to which the exegete belongs. 93
It is important to note that the Shi'a school continues to allow
its imams to perform ijtihad but the Sunni schools do not.' 94 Fiqh
among the Sunni schools relies completely on ijtihad conducted
before the thirteenth century. 95 This particular difference is called
taqlid, which means rigid conformity or blind following. 96 The
taqlid policy began developing in the tenth century when the
ulema (the jurist class in Muslim society) came to believe that all
Shari'a principles that could possibly be reached through ijtihad
had been reached.' 97 Under taqlid no new judge or student of law
may render a decision based on their own ijtihad.98 Abdal-Haqq
explains that this is roughly the equivalent of having an entire
court system boot-strapped to stare decisis in every decision and
having no legislature to make new laws.' 99
Taqlid "was never proven legitimate" and, according to many
commentators, "has had a devastating impact on Islamic law and
culture. ',200 Taqlid remains a controversial doctrine. The results it
brings for women in divorce property settlements (less than fifty
percent of the net) were undoubtedly at the center of the Shari'a
debate in Ontario. Yet, because of the difficulties that taqlid
presents to legal issues arising in the modern Western world, many




194 Id. at 54 (citing IRA G. ZEPP, JR., A MUSLIM PRIMER 152-55 (1992)).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 60 (citing ABDUR RAHIM, THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
ACCORDING TO THE HANAFI, MALIKI, SHAFI'I AND HANBALI SCHOOLS 69 (Kitab Bhavan
1994)).
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members of the Muslim Diaspora of North America have come to
believe that modem life here cannot adequately be addressed by
the older fiqh traditions. 2 1 Thus, it is not uncommon to find
Muslims engaged in ijtihad in North America.2 °2  This
understanding mirrors the cultural conflicts that drove the creation
of the original nineteen schools of fiqh ten centuries ago.
Developing a new understanding of Muslim identity that does not
betray the traditions of Shari'a is critical for the sake of the
identity' s authenticity.2 3
The Fiqh Council of North America, located in Virginia, is an
example of a group working on issues related to the development
of fiqh that is culturally relevant in North America. 2°4 The Council
is not affiliated with any established fiqh school; instead it
advocates a new fiqh school specifically for Muslims living in
non-Muslim countries.2 5 Since there is no ulema operating in
North America, the development of fiqh is completely
unimpeded.20 6 This means that an opportunity that has not been
presented to Muslims in nearly 1,000 years, at least in the area of
family law, was at play for Ontario's Muslim community prior to
Premier McGuinty' s declaration.2 7
C. The Practice of Shari'a-based Arbitration
In her commissioned report, Marion Boyd presented the
arbitration structure of two different groups, one Shi'a and one
Sunni, who have offered arbitration and mediation to Muslims in
Canada.20 8 The formal organization of the groups is striking given
that they exist only to resolve disputes brought in a small niche of
201 Id. at 63 (citing W.D. MUHAMMAD, IMAM W. DEEN MUHAMMAD SPEAKS FROM
HARLEM, N.Y. 33 (1985)).
202 Id.
203 JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH CENTURY
ETHNOGRPAHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 340-43 (1988).
204 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 15, at 63, n.189 (citing YUSEF T. DELORENZO, FIQH AND
THE FIQH COUNCIL OF NORTH AMERICA AND MUSLIM LEGAL DIRECTORY & GUIDE TO
YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS 60-62 (Kareema Altomare ed., 1995)).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 81
207 Id.
208 BOYD, supra note 4, at 57-62.
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the entire legal system. Observing these two groups offers an
insight into the practical construction of Shari'a-based arbitration
organizations in Canada and reflects the strength of the demand
for this legal resource created by Muslim identity.
All of the groups offering arbitration and mediation service
within the Muslim community in Ontario emphasized in their
submissions to Boyd's report that the peaceful resolution of
disputes is a primary goal of the Muslim faith.209 This goal is part
of the Preamble of the Shi'ite Ismaili National Conciliation and
Arbitration Board for Canada, which reads: "When differences of
opinion or disputes arise between them, these should be resolved
by a process of mediation, conciliation and arbitration within
themselves in conformity with the Islamic concepts of unity,
brotherhood, justice, tolerance[,] and goodwill. 210
Unlike Sunnis, who place greater emphasis on the individual,
Shi'ites actually recognize authority figures who define the
orthodox interpretation of Allah's will.21' These authority figures,
called imams, succeed to their positions by heredity.212 Their
authority is considered to be inherited from the Prophet
Muhammad (pbuh) himself.213 Today, the Ismailis are under the
authority of His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan, the forty-ninth
Imam, who traces his lineal descent through the Prophet's
daughter Fatima and son-in-law Ali.21 4 Aga Khan is the spiritual
leader of the Ismailis, who reside in twenty-five different
countries. 1 5
The Imam drafts a constitution that governs the social
relationships within Ismaili communities and the relationships
between these communities. 2 6  The constitution is revised or
209 Id. at 57.
210 Id. (quoting Submission to Ontario Arbitration Review, His Highness Prince Aga
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updated depending on changing needs and circumstances. 2 7 The
most recent constitution, which includes a dispute resolution
system, was created in 1986 and regulates nearly every aspect of
daily life.21 8 Dispute resolution is administered by the National
Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (CABs).
219
The worldwide Ismaili community is divided into fourteen
jurisdictions.22 ° Canada itself has five regional CABs, which
handle the actual cases, and one national CAB, which mainly
promulgates policies and programs. 221  There are formal rules
governing arbitration for the CABs, including regulations about
the composition of the arbitration panel, assistance for parties
preparing submissions, and confidentiality.222
The CABs are comprised completely of volunteers appointed
by the Imam to three-year terms.223 In Ontario, the volunteers
included lawyers, social workers, businesspersons, other qualified
professionals, and former senior community members. 224  The
group in Ontario at the time of Boyd's report consisted of thirty-
four people, including sixteen women.225 CAB volunteers sought
to resolve disputes in a manner that respected the individuals and
the harmony of the community by trying to minimize the financial
and emotional cost for both parties.226 By emphasizing community
values in addition to individual values, the CABs hoped to act as
both a dispute resolution body and a dispute prevention body.
227
These twin goals of individual respect and the maintenance of





220 BOYD, supra note 4, at 58
221 Id.





226 BOYD, supra note 4, at 58-59.
227 Id. at 60.
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1) Before mediating or arbitrating on any dispute, the CABs
must first satisfy themselves that the parties to the dispute have
come to the CABs voluntarily and out of their own free will and
desire to have their disputes resolved through the CAB system;
2) The mediation and arbitration processes are conducted by
CAB members who have received appropriate training to ensure
their competent and equitable handling of the matter;
3) The processes are conducted in accordance with rules that are
intended to assist in assuring the appropriate standard of
operation;
4) The duty of confidentiality to the parties to a dispute must be
absolutely respected.228
The CAB reported that it was accessed in equal numbers by males
and females. 229 The parties were responsible for paying the cost of
preparing their cases and obtaining legal advice, but the actual
process was free.23° Obviously, this led to tremendous savings
compared to the formal court system. 23' The group also reported
that 769 arbitration or mediation cases had been brought to the
CAB between 1998 and 2003.232 The CAB allowed parties to opt
out of the process at any time, but it still achieved a success rate of
sixty-nine percent.233
Masjid El Noor, a Sunni mosque based in Toronto, offers an
example of a Sunni system of mediation and arbitration.234 Masjid
El Noor formally offered counseling, mediation, and arbitration
services to its community beginning in 1982 and informally before
that time.235 The director of the mosque, Mubin Shiakh, was also
the chief mediator.236 The mediation board he directed consisted
of seven people, one of whom was an imam, with the remaining




232 BOYD, supra note 4, at 59.
233 Id.
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seats going to men and women equally. 2 137 Most of the mediators
were professionals from the community who volunteered their
services.238 Participation at Masjid El Noor by the parties to the
process was strictly voluntary.239 To help ensure that consent was
freely given, both parties were given a copy of the pamphlet
"Family Law in Ontario" which was translated in Gujurati and
Urdu by the mosque for those who needed language assistance.24 °
While parties are given the option of appeal to the formal court
systems, Masjid El Noor reported that no appeal had ever been
made.241
Despite the highly structured and equitable service provided by
the CABs and Masjid El Noor, other Muslims in Ontario reported
242widely varying practices across the province. in some instances,
the results of Shari'a-based arbitration were in direct conflict with
Ontarian and Canadian law.243 While not relating directly to
arbitration, a quote from Ali Hindy, leader of the Alaheddin
Mosque in Scarborough, Ontario, serves as an example of the way
some members of the Muslim community flouted family laws:
The Qur'an says a man is limited to four wives. Canadian law
doesn't allow it-God does, so I marry them myself. If your
wife doesn't like sex, you can take another wife. If she can't
give you children, you can take another wife. If a man is
financially capable and a woman doesn't have a husband, you
can marry her as well. 24
The actions and statements of people like Ali Hindy only serve to
confuse the debate. Some leaders in the Muslim community may
237 Id.
238 BOYD, supra note 4, at 60.
239 Id.
240 Id. Gujurati and Urdu are common in India and Pakistan. See CIA World
Factbook, India, https://www.cia.gov/cia//publications/factbook/geos/
in.html; CIA World Factbook, Pakistan, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/pk.html.
241 BOYD, supra note 4, at 61 (citing Submission of Mubin Shaikh, 'Sharia
Tribunals and Masjid El Noor: A Canadian Model' (Aug. 24, 2004)).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 60.
244 Id. (quoting Sally Armstrong, Criminal Justice, 152 CHATELAINE 158 (Nov.
2004)).
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sanction activities, such as a polygamous marriage, that are
consistent with Shari'a but inconsistent with Ontario's laws. As
mentioned before, conducting a polygamous marriage in Ontario
is not only in violation of the limits of the Arbitration Act, it is
also a criminal offense. 245  Nothing about Ontario's arbitration
system which allowed religious arbitration facilitated or
encouraged actions like those of Ali Hindy. Hindy's actions,
therefore, are not related to considerations of whether the
arbitration system allowing use of religious laws was
fundamentally sound. Instead, they merely demonstrate the need
to educate the public and properly enforce the subject matter and
conscionability constraints provided by the Arbitration Act.
D. Women Under Shari'a
The continuation of practices like those of Ali Hindy certainly
concerned the opponents of Shari'a-based arbitration. The
concern, however, was not merely that certain imams might be
operating outside the law. Opponents also claimed that even
within the constraints of the Arbitration Act, the results for
Muslim women were systematically discriminatory.2" Such views
are consistent with the prevailing conceptions of the Muslim
woman that are present in Western societies. These images
shaped much of the debate in Ontario. The Western view of the
Muslim woman since the eighteenth century has been of a woman
innately oppressed. 247 This oppression is portrayed by either the
"rebellious renegade," a Muslim woman who rebels against the
Islamic world, or the "submissive nonentity. 2 48  Many authors
have stressed that Muslim women should speak out to complicate
these images in Western minds in order to realize change.249
245 Id.
246 Examples of groups echoing this view are The National Association of Women
and the Law (NAWL), the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW) and the
National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of Canada. Id. at 31.
247 MOHJA KAHF, WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE MUSLIM WOMAN 177 (1999).
248 Id.
249 See, e.g., id. at 179; Pascale Fournier, The Ghettoisation of Difference in
Canada: "Rape by Culture" and the Danger of a "Cultural Defense" in Criminal Law
Trials, 29 MANITOBA L.J. 81, 119 (2002) ("Women of colour should be encouraged to
attack and problematise mainstream understanding of their culture...").
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The Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW), one of
many interested groups to weigh in with formal position
statements during the Shari'a debate, understood that a more
modem and equitable fiqh might evolve in Ontario, but noted that
"Muslims have... Five Pillars of Practice and there is no sixth
pillar or belief which states that Muslims have to practise fiqh.' 25°
The group, therefore, saw that there would be no guarantees that
an equitablefiqh would emerge. If such afiqh did not emerge and
find widespread application, then any of the extant schools of
Islamic law might be applied in the arbitration process.51
The practices of Muslim leaders like Ali Hindy seem to
confirm that, even in a best case scenario, an emergent fiqh would
meet considerable opposition. Such practices are detrimental to
women in the opinion of groups like CCMW. 2 2  It is
understandable, then, that a group representing Muslim women's
interests in Ontario might side against the uncertainties of
arbitration, as CCMW did. Defeating religious arbitration would
guarantee the gender equality of the Ontario court system to all
Muslim women, a court system whose equality does not depend
on some potentiality.
253
CCMW raises the primary argument brought by the dissenters
to Muslim arbitration: that women are treated unfairly under
Shari'a law. Indeed, most of the debate was framed as a women's
rights issue. Some dissenting groups, such as the CCMW, likely
have a thorough understanding of exactly how women are treated
in a Muslim society. Others, however, may approach the issue
with significantly prejudicial misconceptions. Thus, before
rebutting the argument raised by the CCMW and others that
Muslim arbitration courts should not be allowed to operate in
Canada, it is necessary to clarify the treatment of women under
Shari'a.
Shari'a, under any fiqh school, discusses the rights of women
in detail. Those rights primarily exist in the areas relevant to the
250 Canadian Council of Muslim Women, Position Statement on the Proposed




253 See supra Section II C.
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arbitration debate: marriage, divorce, custody of children, and
inheritance. Despite the fact that the Qur'an is fairly liberal in its
treatment of women, taqlid has effectively frozen much of the
understanding of Muslim women's rights to the complete
subjugation which existed in feudal societies 1,000 years ago.254
During that patriarchal period, the role of women was simply to
produce children and provide pleasure for the husband.255 This
subjugation of women is more deeply entrenched than other
traditions in many Muslim communities.256 Slavery, for example,
was a practice which was originally accepted under Shari'a but
now has been widely abolished, while the old concepts of
women's rights remain.257
Some principles of Shari'a regarding the treatment of women
even date to the period before Islam, called jahiliyah,258 when
women were largely treated as chattel.259 Practices from the
jahiliyah period, called adat, have become part of Shari'a where
the Qur'an or Sunnah did not directly address the issue.260 In
some instances, however, the Qur'an improved women's rights
over these practices. 26' For example, the Qur'an expressly forbade
the common practice of inheriting women as a possession and
rewarded those who did not bury an infant daughter alive, also a
custom dating from the jahiliyah period.262 During jahiliyah there
was no limit on the number of women a man could marry.26 3
According to one commentator, the average number of wives for
each man was ten.2' The verse from the Qur'an used to justify
254 See ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 1.
255 Id. at 3.
256 See id. at 5-6 (discussing the extreme seclusion of women in the Muslim
communities).
257 See id. at 13.
258 See id. at 22-24.
259 SINGH, supra note 179, at 75.
260 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 20.
261 SINGH, supra note 179, at 75.
262 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 20-21. Again, this is only a relative improvement.
Few women today would probably take solace in a set of laws that merely did not reward
a man who buried his infant daughter alive.
263 Id. at21.
264 Id. (quoting Imam al-Tabari). There were apparently instances of men marrying
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polygamy, however, actually seeks to limit the number of wives a
man takes:
And if you have reason to fear that you might not act equitably
towards orphans, then marry from among (other) women such as
are lawful to you - two, three, or four; but if you have a reason
to fear that you might not be able to treat them with equal
fairness, then (only) one-or (from among) those whom you
rightfully possess. This will make it more likely that you will
265not deviate from the right course.
Muslim marriage, called nikah, functions as both a religious
duty, ibadat,266 and a civil contract. 267 The legal aspect entitles the
couple to engage in sexual intercourse and procreate.268 Instead of
the marriage being a sacrament, as Christian marriages often are,
Muslim marriage is sealed just like a contract with an offer by the
potential husband and acceptance by the potential wife, called
ijab-wa-qubul.269 As in any contract, both parties must voluntarily
27consent.   To ensure the voluntary offer and acceptance,
witnesses are generally required.27'
This contract has two key parts: the dower (mahr) and
maintenance (mata'a).272 The tradition of mahr dates from the
jahiliyah when women were sold.273 Whereas in the earlier period
a payment would be made to the marriage guardians (wali), now
five hundred women. Id. at 22.
265 Id. at 22 (quoting THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:3). This raises one of the fundamental
issues among modern Qur'anic commentators-what norm should passages like these
establish? See id. If context is discounted, the norm is that polygamy is appropriate. Id.
When context controls, however, monogamous relationships can be viewed as the ideal
because only those relationships guarantee that women will appropriately be treated with
fairness. Id.
266 QURESHI, supra note 120, at 56-57.
267 Id. at 55.
268 SINGH, supra note 179, at 77.
269 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 22-23.
270 QURESHI, supra note 120, at 55. Engineer notes that the practice of wali, where a
male relative would retain an exclusive right to give the woman away and retain the
mahr, has been done away with. ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 23.
271 QURESHI, supra note 120, at 58. Shi'a law does not require a witness. Id. at 59.
272 SINGH, supra note 179, at 5.
273 Id. at 78.
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the mahr goes directly to the wife.274 Her property is not merged
with the property of the husband after the marriage.275 It is not
intended to function as consideration but more as a nuptial gift.
276
A more realistic appraisal of the mahr emerges in a study of
Muslim women in India.277 The study shows that almost no
women actually received a mahr and most have no idea about the
nature or amount of the mahr negotiated at the marriage. 27' The
payment of the mahr pledged can be deferred to a later time
(mu'ajjal).279  In these cases mahr functions more truly as
psychological insurance because it provides a security against
divorce.28 °
While the couple is married, the husband is completely
obligated to provide for the wife according to his capacity
regardless of her wealth. 281 The wife is not required to spend any
of her money or relinquish any of her property.282 This obligation
is called the "maintenance" and includes payment for food,
residence, and clothing.283 "Food" means cooked food such that
the wife is not obliged to cook.2' Likewise clothing is meant to be
more than cloth, meaning the woman bears no responsibility to
sew her own clothes (an obligation rarely relevant in the
developed world where ready-made clothes are the norm). 285 The
provision of a residence means either a completely separate house
or a private area of the husband's parents' house with private
274 Id. at 79 (citing JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 161
(1964)).
275 QURESHI, supra note 120, at 56; see also ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 55.
276 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 55.
277 SINGH, supra note 179, at 81.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 79 (citing F.B. TYABJI, MUSLIM LAW 107 (1968)).
280 Id. at 5; see also ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 134.
281 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 55. The complete financial obligation placed on
males in Muslim marriages and the fact that assets are not commingled is part of the
underlying justification for women receiving less in divorce settlements. See id. at 138.
282 Id. at 54-55.
283 Id. at 116.
284 id.
285 Id. at 116-17.
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access if a separate house is beyond the husband's means.286 The
man is supposed to pay the woman for breast feeding after she
bears a child or provide a wet nurse if the wife does not wish to
breast feed.287
Maintenance cannot be waived by an agreement of the parties,
and there are very few releases for the husband from the
maintenance duty.288 Mental or physical sickness are not sufficient
to release the duty unless the illness prevents the consummation of
the marriage. 289 A release may occur if the woman commits a
crime and is imprisoned but not if the man commits a crime and is
imprisoned. 290 Also, if a separation can be proved to be the fault
of the wife, then no maintenance is due.29' Slandering one's wife
to make such proof is considered a sin.292 Where the husband is
not present to provide the maintenance, the wife is allowed to take
out a loan in his name.293
Since marriage is a contract under Shari'a, a divorce
dissolving the contract, called talaq, can be effected by the mutual
consent of both parties. 294 A unilateral dissolution is also possible
under Shari'a for both the man and the woman (khula).295 Despite
the fact that marriage is so easy to terminate under Shari'a, the
Qur'an expressly discourages divorce, calling it the most disliked
of permissible acts or abghaz al-Mubahat.
2 96
In the event that a marriage comes to an impasse, the Qur'an
specifically mandates that the couple undergo arbitration. 297 The
husband and wife are supposed to select an arbitrator together,
286 Id. at 117.
287 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 116 (citing THE HOLY QUR'AN 65:6).
288 Id. at 118.
289 ld. at 117.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 112 (citing THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:20).
293 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 117-18.
294 Id. at 121-22. For a complete list of all Qur'anic verses regarding divorce, see
ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 132-34.
295 Id. at 136.
296 Id. at 121.
297 Id. (quoting THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:35).
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
called a hakam, or appoint a person from both the husband and the
wife's families.298 Commentators disagree about whether the
ruling from the arbitration is binding or merely a
recommendation.299
Either way, to perfect a divorce merely requires the male to
pronounce the word 'talaq' twice.' °° This follows from a verse in
the Qur'an:
Such divorce may be pronounced twice; then either retain them
in a becoming manner or send them away with kindness. And it
is not lawful for you that you take anything of what you have
given them (your wives) unless both fear that they cannot
observe the limits prescribed by Allah. But if you fear that they
cannot observe the limits prescribed by Allah, then it shall be no
sin for either of them in what she gives to get her freedom.
These are the limits prescribed by Allah, so transgress them not;
and whoso transgresses the limits prescribed by Allah, it is they
that are the wrongdoers.3 1
The pronunciation was actually a limitation on the practice of
holding a wife in perpetual fear of divorce during jahiliyah when
302 thrdivorce might be repeated any number of times. A third
pronouncement of divorce under Shari'a becomes irrevocable. 3
There is some controversy over whether all three pronouncements
can occur at one time, a practice common among Sunni
Muslims.
3°4
This practice is very detrimental to women because the divorce
is irrevocably valid even if the husband was just angry or even
joking.30 5 Often it is done to punish a wife for refusing to submit
to a husband's authority.3 6 There is no recourse for the woman or
even the regretful husband in this situation. 307 Divorces have been
298 Id. (quoting THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:35).
299 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 121.
300 Id. at 123.
301 Id. (quoting THE HOLY QUR'AN 2:230).
302 Id.
303 Id. at 147.
304 Id.
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conducted like this despite the requirements of the Qur'an for
arbitration.3 °8 But as already shown, divorce in Ontario has only
been allowed to have legal effect under the federal Divorce Act.
The more significant issue in the arbitration discussion is what
property a woman would be entitled to in the event of a divorce
under Shari'a.
A divorced woman is entitled to stay at her husband's house
during the divorce proceeding. 3°9 After the divorce, the woman
continues to be entitled to maintenance in addition to the mahr,
which, if payment was deferred, is due at dissolution. 310  This
flows from the Qur'an which states: "And for the divorced
women, provision (must be made) in kindness. This is incumbent
on those who have regard for duty.,
311
The amount of maintenance required after divorce and the
period of time over which that amount must be provided are not
clearly prescribed by the verse above.312 This has resulted in
tremendous controversy. For example, in India, where Muslims
elect to have Shari'a applied, a Muslim woman named Shah Bano
appealed to the Supreme Court of India for maintenance from her
husband following a divorce based on this verse from the
Qur'an.313 When the court awarded her maintenance in perpetuity,
hundreds of thousands of Indian Muslims sought the enactment of
a law that would limit the obligation of maintenance to the three
months following a valid divorce (a period called iddah).314
Only under one of the Sunni schools, Hanafi, is the obligation
limited to the iddah.315 While the words of the Qur'an, in 2:241,
are fixed, the interpretation as to amount and length of provision is
308 Id. at 151 (noting that most Muslim divorces in India are performed in this way).
309 Id. at 153.
310 Id. at 154, 214. At 4:20, the Qur'an specifically forbids taking back the mahr if
the marriage has been consummated. THE HOLY QUR'AN 4:20. If the marriage has not
been consummated, the husband is entitled to a return of one half of the mahr. Id.
311 THE HOLY QUR'AN 2:241.
312 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 155.
313 SINGH, supra note 179, at 130-63.
314 ENGINEER, supra note 121, at 154-55.
315 Id. at 155. There is also controversy within the Hanafi school regarding the
verse. Id. at 156-57.
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completely left up to human understanding.3"6 Consequently, the
amount a woman will receive under a Shari'a-based divorce
arrangement is largely unpredictable and not subject to
generalization. In short, there is no guarantee of fifty percent
distribution.
A woman who initiates a divorce may be at an even greater
disadvantage in a property settlement. When a woman sues for
divorce under the right of khula mentioned above, it is widely
accepted that she must return the mahr given to her, and she is not
entitled to maintenance for any period unless pregnant.31 7 The
only exception would be situations where an agreement is made
between the spouses before the exercise of khula.1 8 This would
occur when, for example, a wife agrees to provide for the children
in exchange for an allotment of money from the husband.319
IV. The Debate
The debate over Shari'a-based arbitration in Ontario was
carried out on two levels. The first level of argument concerned
the substantive results of religious arbitration in family law
matters, focusing on the results for women considered in the
preceding section. From the perspective of CCMW, and many
others protesting Shari'a-based arbitration, the results are
absolutely discriminatory.32 ° To declare something discriminatory,
however, requires an appeal to some common set of norms.
Creating such a common set of norms that covers all people
becomes incredibly difficult when non-Western cultures are
involved. The perspectives of cultural relativism and universalism
offer different approaches to this level of the debate.
Even if Shari'a-based arbitration could be declared
discriminatory, another problem remains. It is possible that some
Muslim women who were fully apprised of the likely results of
Shari'a-based arbitration and the Ontario formal court system
nevertheless chose Shari'a-based arbitration when it was
316 Id. at 156.
317 Id. at 164.
318 Id. at 165.
319 Id.
320 BOYD, supra note 4, at 46-55.
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permitted. But it seems strange that a person given the choice
would elect a discriminatory over a non-discriminatory process.
So it may be that either the process was not actually
discriminatory, or that women were not actually freely choosing.
The problem of discrimination gives rise to a second level of
the debate. For opponents of Shari'a-based arbitration there was
serious doubt that Muslim women were truly "choosing" Shari'a-
based arbitration.3 2' True choice involves two components: 1) the
Muslim woman must have full knowledge of the option of using
the formal court system and the likely results of that system, and
2) the Muslim woman must also freely consent in the event she
opts for Shari'a-based arbitration with full knowledge of both
systems.
The first aspect of choice-the knowledge aspect-is not
critical to the debate because it merely identifies the need for
education. With proper funding, the government could, at least in
theory, ensure that Muslim women, and all women in general,
know their rights. The second aspect of choice-the free consent
aspect-is more critical, however, because the freedom of
conscience to consent is not necessarily something that the
government can give someone. There are, however, political
structures that can allow the individual greater room to negotiate
options.
At first glance, the consent issue seems to be addressed by the
Arbitration Act. After all, the most important limitation governing
arbitration and contracts in general is that the parties must freely
consent.322 If it was shown that a woman did not consent to
arbitration, then the results of the arbitration would be
unenforceable. 323  Opponents of Shari'a-based arbitration,
however, argued that the consent of Muslim women is influenced
on a much more subtle social level than the level observed by
courts in considering whether to enforce an arbitral award. This
subtle pressure is described in the submission of one group to
Marion Boyd's report:
321 See, e.g., Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals
Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 154, 218-19 (2003).
322 BOYD, supra note 4, at 50.
323 Id. at 13.
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[Our group] is concerned that arbitration may not be chosen
freely in many circumstances. For some women there may be
very strong pressures based on culture and/or religion, or fear of
social exclusion. These issues may be very real in faith-based
communities, where some women may be called a bad adherent
to a particular faith or even an apostate if they do not comply
with arbitration. Such condemnation would leave such women
very alone, shunned in their communities or even their houses of
worship, and would only compound feelings of alienation
created by a family break-up. In addition, there are many
women whose economic lives depend on a close association
with their faith-based community or cultural group. This is
particularly true of immigrant women who find jobs first in their
own communities. These women may be particularly vulnerable
to community pressure and may lose their jobs if they do not
comply with arbitration. Some women may also fear
immigration consequences. For other women there may be fear
of violence .... When these conditions are present it is not
accurate or reasonable to suggest that arbitration is being chosen
324freely.
For groups like the one above, the only solution to this
problem would be to ban religious arbitration. By banning
arbitration outright, there could be no shame for a woman in using
the formal court system of Ontario.3 25  The problem with this
argument is that, in trying to ensure that women are never forced
into "choosing" Shari'a-based arbitration, women lose the chance
of choosing Shari'a arbitration. Such an approach seeks to resolve
the inherent tension in multiculturalism by siding with individual
rights to the complete exclusion of minority rights.326
A. Cultural Relativism vs. Universalism
Various methods for evaluating the problems raised by
multiculturalism have been developing in the West for quite some
time.3 27  Melville Herskovits presented an early conception of
324 Id. at 51 (quoting the submission of Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF)).
325 Id. at 53.
326 Id. at 89.
327 Eibe Riedel, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Pluralism, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM, AND DEMOCRACY-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 25,
27 (Christian Stark ed., 1999).
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relativism which declared that cultural plurality makes the
development of common norms impossible.328 For Herskovits, a
dignity was inherent in every body of custom so the only unifying
concept for all was toleration.329
Herskovits' approach would likely have allowed Shari'a-based
arbitration to be practiced in Canada. Under a theory of cultural
relativism, all of Canada's laws would have to be accountable to
the notion of tolerance.33 °  When considering the Muslim
community in Canada, all Canadians would have to recognize the
dignity of the customs of that community. It would be improper,
therefore, to criticize the results of Shari'a-based arbitration as
discriminatory towards women because there are no common
norms across the various cultures in Canada that would enable one
to objectively call the results discriminatory.331
This 'tolerance' approach, however, is fraught with problems.
Stanley Fish, in his essay Boutique Multiculturalism,332 recognized
that multiculturalism fails at the contact point between cultures,
ironically the concept's raison d'tre. This is because the
elevation of difference naturally leads to a suppression of
particularized differences as cultures compete against the
freedoms of other cultures on the basis of their own distinction.333
Eventually, society must choose one culture to side with in the
competition, at which point the multicultural project fails.
33 4
Not only is cultural relativism unsound philosophically, it can
also have the practical effect of approbating gross cruelties in a
328 Id. at 30 (citing MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS 76 (1950)).
329 Id. at 30 (quoting MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, MAN AND His WORKS 76 (1950)).
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 Stanley Fish, Boutique Multiculturalism, in MULTICULTURALISM AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 69, 70 (Arthur M. Melzer et al. eds., 1998).
333 Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89, 109
n. 124 (2000).
334 Id To apply Fish's observation to Shari'a, it must be remembered that Shari'a
is meant to govern all society. To fully "tolerate" Shari'a would mean to expand its
application to everyone in Canada. Such expansion would inevitably offend certain
orders, such as the Sunday Sabbath, which are important to Christian identity in Canada.
It is at this friction point, when a choice must be made between the two competing
customs, that pure relativism would fail.
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judicial system through the development of cultural defenses. 335
To illustrate, one might consider Shari'a-based arbitration and
tolerate the practice because, while we do not award women so
little in a divorce settlement, they (meaning Muslims) do. Since
Shari'a is part of their culture, who are we to interfere? This form
of tolerance in the face of certain cultural practices is known as the
"cultural defense. ' ' 336  One commentator who criticized the
emergence of cultural defenses has pointed out "that culture is
neither static nor homogenous and that culture is experienced and
described variously by individuals situated differently within a
particular community., 337  The same critic insists that simply
understanding and valuing differences between groups should not
destroy our abilities to judge those differences.338
Pascale Fournier highlights a shocking case in Quebec that
reflected a court operating under a philosophy of cultural
relativism, implementing a doctrine of cultural defense.339 In R. v.
Ammar Nouasria, which involved a Muslim defendant and victim,
the thirty-seven year-old defendant was found guilty of the sexual
touching of a person under the age of fourteen, invitation to the
sexual touching of a person under the age of fourteen, engaging in
anal intercourse with a minor, and sexual assault. 340 The victim
was the defendant's stepdaughter, who was between the ages of
nine and eleven at the time of the incidents. 341 The sexual activity
included fellatio, anal intercourse, touching of the breasts, and
touching of the vaginal area with the defendant's penis and fingers
but not vaginal intercourse.342
The maximum penalty for these crimes was ten years of
imprisonment, but the defendant received only a concurrent
sentence of twenty-three months and one year of probation.3 43 The
335 Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1595 (1996).
336 Volpp, supra note 333, at 110.
337 Id.
338 See id. at 112.
339 Foumier, supra note 249, at 115.
340 R. v. Ammar Nouasria, [1994] 63 Q.A.C. 109.
341 Fournier, supra note 249, at 105.
342 R. v. Ammar Nouasria, [1994] 63 Q.A.C. 109.
343 Id.
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fact that the defendant had not engaged in vaginal intercourse was
the mitigating factor for the court because, as the court saw it, the
defendant had sought to preserve the girl's virginity. 344 The court
held:
The mitigating factors are the fact that the accused did not have
normal and complete sexual relations with the victim, that is to
say, vaginal sexual relations, to be more precise, so that he could
preserve her virginity, which seems to be a very important value
in their religion. We can say that, in a certain way, the accused
spared his victim.
345
Foumier remarks that the opinion reveals "the existence of a
different value system for Muslim people living in Canada is
constructed, one based on the notion of cultural difference as
inferiority."
346
The opinion delivered in R. v. Ammar Nouasria shows that
cultural relativism is an untenable position for approaching
cultural pluralism, especially in legal matters. The use of cultural
relativism simultaneously delivers legal results that shock the
mainstream society and offend the dignity of the defendant's
cultural community. In addition to these practical shortcomings
are the philosophical failings of the concept already introduced.
Cultural relativism, therefore, is not a reasonable defense for
Shari'a-based arbitration in Canada.
Many Canadians felt that the defeat of religious arbitration in
Ontario was a rejection of cultural relativism. Recognizing the
failing of the philosophy, Rosie DiManno echoed the views of
many Canadians when she wrote, "[t]he time has come for
Canadians to be weaned off the teat of multiculturalism as a
primary source of sustenance and self-identity.'37 But what
philosophy was guiding those who successfully defeated religious
arbitration in Ontario?
Universalism developed in response to cultural relativism's
failings as an attempt to offer criteria that would allow certain




347 Rosie Dimanno, Sharia Solution a Fair One and Not Racist, TORONTO STAR,
Sept. 16, 2005, at A2.
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identity.348 The basic principal underlying universalism is in direct
opposition to cultural relativism: a claim that the development of
universal norms is possible because there are common features in
all cultures relating to human values.34 9 Universalism is the basis
for human rights theory and international systems implementing
those theories, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR).35°
Universalism begins by declaring that all human beings have
certain rights simply because they are human beings. 3 ' This
concept of natural rights was first described by John Locke as the
rights of life, liberty, and property, which were meant to stand in
opposition to the absolutist state.352 Immanuel Kant followed
Locke with a philosophy based on the notion of human dignity as
ethical autonomy. 353 Kant described this human dignity as the
spiritual autonomy of human beings.354
Universalism was the predominant philosophy of those who
moved to defeat Shari'a-based arbitration in Ontario.
Universalists viewed Shari'a-based arbitration as discriminatory
towards women and called for banning it on that basis.355 When
the new legislation was passed banning all forms of religious
arbitration, Attorney-General Michael Bryant said that passage of
the legislation meant there would be only one law for all
Ontarians, regardless of their religion.356 This statement directly
draws from the slogan "One Law for All," which was used in the
debate by opponents of Shari'a-based arbitration.357
348 Riedel, supra note 327, at 37.
349 Id. at 31.
350 Id. at 30-31.
351 Id. at 34 (citing Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights and the Culture Wars, 8/1
INT'L J.--CAN. INST. INT'L AFF. 94, 95 (1997-1998)).
352 Id. at 34.
353 Id. at 35.
354 Riedel, supra note 327, at 37 (citing RALPH ALEXANDER, LORz MODERNES
GRUND-UND MENSCHENRECHTSVERSTANDNIS 122 (1986)).
355 BOYD, supra note 4, at 46-55.
356 Ontario Passes Bill Prohibiting Religious Arbitration, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto,
Canada), Feb. 15, 2006, at A8.
357 See, e.g., Homa Arjomand, Speech in Paris: Sharia Law and Globalization of
Political Islam (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.nosharia.com/Speech%20in%2OParis.htm.
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For many, the underlying principle of this uniting law is
secularism. Take, for example, Homa Arjomand's appeal, which
expresses the secular absolutism prevailing in France:358
We need a secular state and secular society that respects human
rights and is founded on the principle that power belongs to the
people and not a God. It is crucial to oppose the Sharia law and
to subordinate Islam to secularism and secular states .... We,
the defenders of secularism, believe that the introduction of a
Shariah tribunal or a "Shariah court" in Canada would
discriminate against ... women.
359
The criticism of Arjomand's position is that she fails to appreciate
that Shari'a cannot be clearly discerned as one single body of law.
Arjomand can only conceive of one Shari'a, and it is always
oppressive to women. The appeal also improperly assumes that
the secularism hoped for will actually be free from influence by
the Christian norms already latent in Canadian society. But, under
an ostensibly secular society in the West, the most basic things,
such as the structure of the work week, are completely based on
Christian norms.
3 60
Consistent with this observation, universalism draws the
immediate criticism that, far from being a unifying system, it is
merely Western imperialism in disguise.361 Critics of the theory
point out that universalism is too individualistic and anti-
collectivist to be compatible with cultures that emphasize
community identity over individual rights.362 For a culture that
values an individual's role as part of a group, such as a family or
clan, spiritual autonomy is a threat to the subsistence of its cultural
traditions.
363
The application of universalism to Islamic cultures clearly
358 BOYD, supra note 4, at 89 (citing AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTRAL
JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 73 (2001)).
359 Id. at 47.
360 Id. at 46.
361 Riedel, supra note 327, at 27 (citing Human Rights: A Western Contract With
Limited Applicability, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1,
4 (Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab eds., 1979)).
362 Id. at 32.
363 Id.
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reveals the cultural threat of this individualist approach.3 64  The
most basic problem for many Muslims is that Shari'a claims to
represent the principles of Allah for humanity.3 6' Locke's
anthropocentric notion of natural rights is anathema to Muslims
holding this traditional view.366 For example, apostasy is still
considered a most serious crime in Islamic states.367 People who
change their religion no longer receive the traditional punishment
of death in these countries, but they still suffer legal
disadvantages.368 Islamic cultures refuse to recognize a personal
freedom to choose a religion, so their conception of apostasy is in
direct conflict with Kant's notion of individual spiritual
autonomy.
369
Notwithstanding the difficulty of fitting universalism to certain
views of Islam, many modernist and secularist Muslim authors
attempt to harmonize universalism with Shari'a.370 This is a prime
example of the use of ijtihad. These harmonization attempts
typically frame Shari'a in its historical context and then add
modern notions of equality, such as individual liberty.371 Yet,
given that many Muslims desire to practice Shari'a in its
traditional form, general acceptance of human rights requires the
reservation of space for these traditional groups to adapt to
universal norms.372
364 Id. at 39.
365 Id. at 38. Riedel notes that there is no one unifying conception of human rights
among Islamic scholars. There are at least four main schools of thought: Islamists,
traditionalists, modernists, and secularists. Modernist authors, such as Abul a'la
Mawdudi, have tried to show that human rights can be deduced from the Qur'an. Id. at
35, 38.
366 Riedel, supra note 327, at 39 (citing Hassan Hanafi, Minimal Standard,
Pluralisation and Universalisation, Introduction, in MENSCHENRECHTE ZWISCHEN
UNIVERSALISIERUNGSANSPRUCH UND KULTURELLER KONTEXTUALISERUNG 239, 243 (Han
May & Sybille Fritsch-Oppermann eds., 1993)).
367 Id. at 39.
368 Id. (citing Heiner Bielefeldt, Menschrechte und Islam, in DIE MENSCHRECHTE-
UNSERE VERANTWORTUNG 124, 127 (Herman Weber ed., 1991)).
369 Id.
370 Id. at 40.
371 Id. See, e.g., ENGINEER, supra note 121 (emphasizing the importance of
jahiliyah for a contextual understanding of Islam's approach to women's rights).
372 Riedel, supra note 327, at 41.
[Vol. XXXIU
RELIGIOUS ARBITRATION & MUSLIM IDENTITY
Universalism ultimately fails because it does not comprehend
that identity is not fixed.373 Islam and Muslim communities are
not monolithic, unified, ahistorical realities.374 Under cultural
relativism, Shari'a-based arbitration would be accepted even
though the results seem oppressive to women because oppression
of women must be a norm of being Muslim. Universalism that
acts too soon would reject Shari'a-based arbitration outright
because it is oppressive and insists that Muslim women assimilate
to the ostensibly universal, but actually Western, norms of the
majority. What is needed instead is the opportunity for Muslims
in Ontario and members of the majority to carry on a cultural
exchange-to negotiate, as Fournier says, "[the] knowledge of what
it means to be different, and how and why it matters. 375 Only by
promoting this exchange can Muslim identity be properly
preserved and melded into Western society.
B. Autonomy and Consent
At the extreme end of the opposition to Shari'a-based
arbitration, dissenters were concerned not only that a Muslim
woman might be pressured into consenting to the process against
her will, but also that a Muslim woman might actually freely
consent to the process. In words that directly mirror Plato's vision
of the family state,376 Arjomand sets out her vision for a society
where the social slate is wiped clean of Islam or any other
"inferior" set of values:
One thing I need to make clear in here is that children have no
religions. No parents own the children. It is the society that
decides what is good for children .... All children should be
treated equally .... No one has the right to impose religion on
children under the age of 16. No one has the right to prevent the
child from [experiencing] all norms and standard[s] of the
mainstream society[,] and it is the state['s] duty to protect the
universal rights of children.377
For Arjomand and others like her, even if universalism's goal of
373 Fournier, supra note 249, at 117.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 118.
376 See AMy GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 25-26 (rev. ed., 1999).
377 Arjomand, supra note 357.
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finding a unifying set of values looks almost impossible, the mere
possibility of discovering something so valuable calls for the
subordination of all other values.378 Amy Gutman points out that
the only rebuttal to a claim like Arjomand's is to show that the
freedom of individuals to pursue their own vision of the good life
and the good society has a value.37 9 Catriona McKinnon states that
"[t]he place to start is with the claim that cultural group
membership is an intrinsic good; that is, that it realises a good that
is necessary for and integral to the good of individual members,
and that this good cannot be realised in any other way.,
38 1
McKinnon's case can be made by focusing on the self-respect
enjoyed by individual members in the group. 3 1 Empowering self-
respect means allowing a person to act "in ways at least consistent
with, and preferably supportive of, her self-conception., 382 This
cannot be achieved if Muslim women are forced never to choose
Shari'a-based arbitration.
It is interesting to note that Canada has heeded Gutman's and
McKinnon's advice in the past, even if Ontario departed from it in
the Shari'a debate. Canada considered a ban on the hijab in
public schools only a decade ago in a case that raised an allegation
of the nonconsensual oppression of Muslim women. 38 3 In that
case, the Quebec Human Rights Commission was able to identify
the value of the freedom Gutman spoke of for a Muslim girl.384
Thirteen year-old Emilie Ouimet was excluded from her
middle school in Quebec in 1995 for wearing the hijab in violation
of a school dress code.385 The dress code prohibited any clothing
or accessories that would marginalize a student.386 Opponents of
the hijab argued with universalist gusto, just as they have in the
arbitration debate, that the hijab is oppressive to women who do
378 GUTMAN, supra note 376, at 25.
379 Id.
380 CATRIONA MCKINNON, TOLERATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 198 (2006).
381 Id. (citing WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 192-93
(1989)).
382 Id. at 104.
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not freely consent to wearing it.387
The Quebec Human Rights Commission disagreed.388 The
court recognized that many people might feel a concern for the
right of equality for Muslim women "who consciously or not,
might not wear the veil entirely of their own will. ' 389 Despite this
risk, the court asserted the following:
Out of respect for the people who choose to wear the veil we
must assume that this choice is a way of expressing their
religious affiliation and convictions. In our view it would be
insulting to the girls and women who wear the veil to suppose
that their choice is not an enlightened (sic) one, or that they do
so to protest against the right to equality .... In general terms,
therefore, the veil should be seen as licit, to be prohibited or
regulated only if it can be proved that public order or the
equality of the sexes is threatened.39°
Fournier observes that knowledge of the Muslim woman in the
court's view is undefined, rather than anchored in the traditional
Western view of the Muslim woman as "oppressed."'3 9' This
departure from the essentialist cultural identity of Muslim women
is consistent with the intersectionist perspective which sees
individuals at the intersection of various identities.392  The two
competing aspects of the Muslim woman's identity are her role as
a member of the Muslim community and her role as a citizen of
Ontario. Intersectionist perspectives seek to offer a response to
the tension between Arjomand's pro-state secular absolutism that
prioritizes the individual and the cultural relativism-influenced,
non-interventionist perspective which prioritizes the minority
group.393  Allowing Shari'a-based arbitration would have been
387 Id. at 117.
388 Id. at 115.
389 Fournier, supra note 249, at 116 (quoting Monique Rochon & Pierre Bosset,
Religious Pluralism in Quebec: A Social and Ethical Challenge, in THE QUEBEC HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION 9 (Feb. 1995)).
390 Id. at 116.
391 Id.
392 BOYD, supra note 4, at 91-92.
393 For a general discussion of intersectionality and the related concept of
multidimensionality, see Darren Leonard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality
"Multidimensionality" and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 285 (2001).
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consistent with an intersectionist perspective.
V. Conclusion
Ontario has an arbitration system that can be used voluntarily
to settle private disputes between individuals. The Arbitration Act
is largely related to procedure, leaving the substantive issues to
private parties. This wide discretion has the potential to generate
results that are different from the results that the Canadian or
Ontarian legal system would deliver.
In Ontario, the Arbitration Act does not operate without any
conscionability limitations. The statutes allowing the operation of
family law arbitration and domestic contracts consistently attempt
to anticipate unfairness and prohibit it.394 This is especially true in
regard to the identification of dependents' claims in domestic
contracts.395 It is true, therefore, that no person in Canada is
completely free in his or her private arrangements.
From one perspective, the fact that Muslim arbitration might
not be able to fully function under Ontario's current system of
arbitration and domestic contracts is a fatal blow to the argument
for allowing it. The basic premise of the argument for allowing
Muslim arbitration is that Islamic law is critical to Muslim
identity. But if Islamic law would not fully operate even under the
system that allowed limited arbitration, then Muslim identity
would never be fully realized.
This perspective, however, fails to appreciate that the
application of Shari'a to family law issues is arguably the most
important to Muslim identity. Whereas many areas of Shari'a,
such as the traditional prohibition of usury, are extremely difficult
for orthodox and even progressive Muslims living in Western
societies, Alka Singh writes, "the question of marriage or
divorce.., touches the very basis of interpersonal and
intrapersonal relationships." '396
This same perspective also fails to take into account that the
conscionability limits on the arbitration process are much more
fatal to the argument of those who dissented against Shari'a-based
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 SINGH, supra note 179, at 3.
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arbitration. After all, if Shari'a-based arbitration would not be
allowed to operate outside the constraints of fairness imposed on
all Ontarians, to declare it unfair would be to declare all of
Ontario's legal system unfair. Arguing against Shari'a-based
arbitration merely on the grounds of its results, therefore, becomes
tantamount to racism, revealing the latent imperialist strain in the
ostensibly universalist arguments. The racism inherent in some of
the arguments presented against Shari'a-based arbitration was
exceedingly difficult to hide given that opposition to religious
arbitration generally did not appear until 2003 when the IICJ
attracted attention. The condemnation of Shari'a-based arbitration
came after years of open religious arbitration in Ontario by
Catholics and Jews.
Muslim arbitration may create singular offenses to fairness by
generating results that are consistently on the fringes of
conscionability through its systematic disadvantage toward
women. But that merely furthers the argument that the policies
defining fairness in arbitration and domestic contracts need to be
changed for all Ontarians. Indeed, Marion Boyd recommended
that Muslim arbitration be allowed to operate, but also suggested
numerous reforms to arbitration and family law in Ontario.397
Instead of involving the diverse interests of Canada's secular and
religious groups in developing a common set of acceptable
constraints, McGuinty opted for the "nuclear option" by removing
all religious arbitration outright.
For the most sophisticated contributors to the debate, the
difficulty with religious arbitration, and Shari'a-based arbitration
specifically, was the combination of financially disadvantageous
results in arbitration compared to the formal court system and the
risk that women would not freely consent to arbitration. The
dissenters recognized, however, that the differences between
Shari'a-based arbitration and the formal court system are justified
on the basis of the voluntary consent of the private parties.
Informed consent to the process becomes critical to the outside
observer sensitive to fairness where a result in arbitration for one
party is less attractive than the likely result for that party in the
formal court system. This is especially true where the
disadvantages of a certain type of arbitration become consistent
397 BOYD, supra note 4, at 133.
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and the gender of the disadvantaged party is predictable. The
protection of the individual's consent, however, cannot be honored
at the expense of the group aspect of the individual's identity.
The Arbitration Act provided the quintessential intersectionist
solution to this dilemma by providing a process for the resolution
of the private matters most important to identity (family law) with
regulated government oversight of the process. By using
arbitration, the Muslim community was actually able to draw on
the legal structure of the mainstream society to express itself.
3 98
At the same time, the state wass actually invited into the
community through the judicial oversight guaranteed by the
Arbitration Act.3 99 This interaction must inevitably lead to the
dialogue referenced by Fournier, where the knowledge and
importance of differences can be negotiated.'
While many voices in the Muslim community sounded
resolutely opposed to such negotiation, the Muslim identity,
grounded in Shari'a, already contains the resources necessary for
the negotiation project. The very fact of the emigration of many
Muslims out of the Muslim world reflects that the previously
dormant tool of ijtihad has the potential of awakening again.
ljtihad provides an opportunity for Muslim identity to evolve
while remaining connected to the past, a point crucial to the
authenticity of an identity.
It is encouraging that Marion Boyd has already produced a
report making recommendations to improve the process in Ontario
should the debate ever swing back in favor of permitting religious
arbitration. Other governments would do well to consider the
policy advice she has offered when approaching the question of
religious arbitration. In Ontario, hopefully cooler heads will
prevail as time passes, and the idea of religious arbitration for
family law issues will be revisited. The innate need for such a
process has not vanished with the passage of legislation banning it.
The voices of those already in Ontario who supported Shari'a-
based arbitration only promise to become louder with each fresh
wave of immigration.
DONALD BROWN
398 Id. at 93.
399 Id.
400 Foumier, supra note 249, at 118.
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